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Eighteen or Thirty, But Not Twenty-Two
John Henry Schlegel*
Most law students love the law but eventually come to hate law school.
I suppose that this has always been true. Surely apprentices were not entranced with the task of copying forms. Complaints abound about boring
teachers in early law schools. Langdell's Socratic antidote to boring lectures
brought equally well-documented complaints. Curiously, in the twentieth
century, widespread discontent first appeared in the 1930s at Harvard,
peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s with agitation for a more relevant
legal education, but subsided thereafter, apparently as the required curriculum declined in scope, electives multiplied, and clinics and internships
proliferated.
Explanations for the generalized discontent of law students are numerous and anything but consistent. I believe that much of this discontent has its
roots in the content of the law school curriculum. A significant amount of
the rest is the result of a mismatch between the age of the typical student and
the mode of instruction. Remedying this mismatch should mitigate much of
the law student discontent with legal education. In the words of the title of
this little billet doux, if one wishes to reduce student complaints about legal
education, then one should enter law school at the age of eighteen or thirty
but not at twenty-two. To understand how this might be so, it is necessary to
examine the relationship of the culture of law school to that institution's
pedagogy.
The culture of the contemporary law school is much like the culture of
the American middle school. Where but a year earlier individuals who are
now law students traveled in mixed gender packs, upon encountering the law
they re-segregate by gender. Budding romances-defined as being seen
alone together twice-are instant "news" in the small goldfish bowl of daily
class interaction. The middle schooler's sense that this stuff we are supposed
to be learning is all very new is duplicated in law school and made even
more threatening because the law school student body's collection of aggressive, high achieving individuals is proportionately far larger than that of any
middle school. Still, quite quickly the law school separates into the nerdy
gunners, the diligent and modestly interested core, the ostentatiously
uninvolved, the furtively scared, and the openly hostile-groups that can be
found in any middle school. A method of instruction that always ends discussion with "it depends" only makes the situation worse for individuals
who thought that they were through with this "baby stuff' when they gradu-
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ated from high school. In such circumstances, unhappiness with legal education should hardly be a surprise.
When trying to figure out how to diminish student unhappiness at finding themselves in middle school again, one should remember the circumstances under which the modem law school developed. Langdell's law
school was part of a university where the average age of entering undergraduates had only recently risen above eighteen,' where earning a "C" was not
an embarrassment, and where the method of instruction had only recently
begun to shift from the reading of a text and recitation to that new German
import-the lecture. In this university, a student did not need a college degree to matriculate in law and almost anyone with modest academic credentials was free to enroll, knowing that the likelihood of success in completing
the program was no better than two out of three.'
It is hardly surprising that it was during the Depression that serious
complaints emerged about an education designed for Langdell's students. It
was a time in which most students were college graduates, most colleges had
gone to a primarily elective curriculum, and pervasive unemployment made
most students highly conscious of the cost of education and so of the necessity that value be delivered in each and every year. In our world where the
ubiquitous LSAT and the pressure of law school rankings guarantee that a
class will consist of individuals possessing almost homogenous qualifications, who have had freedom in college in selecting their courses, and have
seldom, if ever, had a semester's grade turn on one roll of the dice in a closed
book exam, significant discontent is all but guaranteed, if only because the
grading system is designed to convert almost homogeneous ability into
neatly stratified ranks.'
What, therefore, is to be done with the contemporary mismatch between the pedagogy of legal education and the expectations of the students
enrolled? One thing that is unlikely to work is a proposal to reduce class
sizes radically to those typical of junior and senior undergraduate courses
with the appropriate accompanying alteration of pedagogy. The cost of such
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Radical Solutions

a reform in terms of faculty salaries would be prohibitive, at least unless a
school decided to flood its curriculum with adjunct instructors from the
world of practice. Law professors are far too insecure in their role to agree to
such an alteration of their ranks. There are, however, two other alternatives.
First, one might simply start admitting eighteen year olds. After all,
almost everywhere in the world, law is an undergraduate discipline. The
continuity in terms of a heavily required curriculum would be consistent
with student experience in high school and the ability to take courses in
other departments would leaven the loaf of the average law student, as well
as provide an alternative to the daily diet of large classes that most law
students endure today. Law school pedagogy could quite easily continue relatively unchanged. Having known nothing of the intellectual richness of the
education available at any good college or university, law students would be
less likely to feel infantilized by being called on in class and finding the
material unintelligible at first and then numbingly repetitive after a while.
There would, of course, be the problem of status anxiety among faculty who
could no longer claim to be delivering a graduate education, but some might
be able to overcome their anxiety when they find that teaching eager eighteen year olds is significantly more fun then teaching sullen twenty-two year
olds.
The other alternative would be to limit admission to individuals thirty
or older. By such an age, all but the most indulged of trust fund babies will
have had to earn a living for half a dozen years. Being out in the world for a
while changes students enormously. They do not come to law school because law seems to be glamorous or because they imagine they have no
better alternatives. Instead, they come because law practice seems to be a
better idea than some reality that they have already experienced. Since they
would be ripping apart a settled family life to come to law school, they know
what they want out of their education and would be unlikely to put up with a
program that does not deliver the desired product. If they find that they have
made a mistake, they are not likely to hang around for want of something
better.
Most importantly, as real, not supposed adults, older students are unlikely to put up with an education that treats them as if they were back in
middle school. Pedagogy will have to change whether the law professors
like it or not. These students are unlikely to put up with learning law as
students do now: the way a bad owner trains a dog-by rapping it on the
nose when it does something wrong. So, instruction would likely be more
didactic, as well as focused less on doctrine and more on the practices, in
both senses-routine activities and specialty areas, of lawyers. Concomitantly, there would be less discussion of cases and more of legal documents,
such as agreements, pleadings and regulations, fewer exams but significantly
more written assignments related to such documents. Overall, law school
would become more descriptively, as opposed to normatively, theoretical
with respect to both rule systems and practices and so more concretely
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anchored. It is possible that current law professors would prefer such teaching to the present system, since their students would not need to be disabused of so many of their notions about how law works and could contribute
to every class the background of social, economic, and political life that
makes law come alive. Alternatively, a new species of law professor might
emerge.
Of course, these proposals are utopian. That is the point. The way that
law is taught is unconscionable, as is made clear by the middle school atmosphere that results. If pedagogy is going to infantilize students, then at the
least law schools ought to focus teaching on students who are closer to being
infants. However, present pedagogy makes life too easy for faculty to be
dislodged without changing the law school's current market. Big classes are
cheap. The current classroom style of questioning that hides a rudimentary
lecture avoids the heavy lifting that real lecture would require. It also limits
what would have to be known by faculty about the details of the practices of
law. Because faculty think that no one needs to see a credit agreement before
practicing corporate law, and because twenty-two year old students will not
demand such an experience, faculty currently will not bore themselves with
such unimportant details. Similarly, because such students do not push for
large doses of descriptive theory, faculty can spend excessive time doing
normative theory, moving feathers from one side of the balance to the other,
all the while talking about how to solve social problems optimally, as if,
after hard political infighting for uncertain stakes in uncertain circumstances,
most solutions are anything but "least-worst." Killing this pedagogical stasis
is unlikely without a significantly older student body and so I put my chit on
that square.

